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Understanding MACs: Moral Hazard in Acquisitions
Ronald J. Gilson* and Alan Schwartz**
February, 2004
Abstract
The standard contract that governs friendly mergers contains a material adverse change clause
(a “MAC”) and a material adverse effect clause (a “MAE”); these clauses permit a buyer costlessly to
cancel the deal if such a change or effect occurs. In recent years, the application of the traditional
standard-like MAC and MAE term has been restricted by a detailed set of exceptions that curtails the
buyer’s ability to exit. The term today engenders substantial litigation and occupies center stage in the
negotiation of merger agreements. This paper asks what functions the MAC and MAE term serve,
what function the exceptions serve and why the exceptions have arisen only recently. It answers that
the term encourages the target to make otherwise noncontractable synergy investments that would
reduce the likelihood of low value realizations, because the term permits the buyer to exit in the event
the proposed corporate combination comes to have a low value. The exceptions to the MAC and
MAE term impose exogenous risk on the buyer; the parties cannot affect this risk and the buyer is a
relatively superior risk bearer. The exceptions have arisen recently because the changing nature of
modern deals make the materialization of exogenous risk a more serious danger than it had been. The
modern MAC and MAE term thus responds to the threat of moral hazard by both parties in the
sometimes lengthy interim between executing a merger agreement and closing it. The paper’s empirical
part examines actual merger contracts and reports preliminary results that are consistent with the
analysis.

*

Charles J. Meyers Professor of Law and Business, Stanford University and Stern Professor of
Law and Business, Columbia University.
**

Sterling Professor of Law, Professor School of Management, Fellow International Center for
Finance, Yale University.
This paper benefitted from presentations at the American Law and Economics Association
Meetings, the National Bureau of Economics Law & Economics Summer Session (2003), the NYU
Law and Finance Workshop, the University of San Diego Law and Political Theory Workshop, and
the Wharton School of Business - University of Pennsylvania Law School joint workshop, and from
comments by Barry Adler, Jennifer Arlen, Ian Ayres, Richard Brooks, Allen Ferrell, Victor Goldberg,
Michael Klausner, Alvin Klevorick, Jon Macey, Frank Partnoy, Ben Polak Roberta Romano, and
Robert Scott. We are especially grateful for the research assistance of Sarah Johnson.

2

1. Introduction
Corporate assets commonly transfer under acquisition agreements and these have crystalized
into a fairly standard form.1 Despite its immense commercial significance, however, the standard
acquisition agreement has excited almost no academic commentary.2 This paper begins a study of the
standard agreement by focusing on a set of terms that now receives considerable attention from lawyers
and courts, the material adverse change clause (the “MAC”) and its equivalent, the material adverse
event clause (the “MAE”).3
The negotiation of MACs and MAEs historically was not the object of bargaining concern.
James Freund’s 1975 classic Anatomy of a Merger thus treats the topic in a page and a half. 4 A typical

1

The standard form does not apply to hostile acquisitions, defined as transactions to which the
target board does not agree. The bulk of acquisitions are not hostile, however. Even in the 1980s, the
decade of the hostile takeover, 86% of acquisitions were friendly. In the 90s, this fraction rose to 96%.
Acquisitions are of major economic significance. Thus, in 1995 mergers accounted for 5% of US GDP
and 48% of nonresidential investment. See Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford, “New Evidence and
Perspectives on Mergers, 15 J. Econ. Perspectives 103 (2001).
2

An early exception is in Ronald J. Gilson, “Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills
and Asset Prices”, 89 Yale L. J. 239 (1989).
3

Commonly, the same numbered paragraph in the standard agreement will include both a
material adverse change clause and a material adverse event clause. We sometimes refer to both of
these clauses together as MACs.
4

James Freund, Anatomy of a Merger: Strategies and Techniques for Negotiating Corporate
Acquisitions 259-61 (1975).

3
term would permit the buyer not to close the transaction on the post-execution occurrence of “any
change, occurrence or state of facts that is materially adverse to the business, financial condition or
results of operations” of the seller (i.e., the “target”). This language is ambiguous with respect to
significant issues. As an illustration, did a material change in the target’s “business” include a change
whose only impact would be on the target’s future cash flows, because the current value of the
business is the discounted value of future flows, or would additional language be required to reach this
result? The term “prospects” could be added to the litany of objects of the MAC clause, or the clause
could expand to specify that a change that would or was likely to have a future effect also was covered.
These and other ambiguities in the typical MAC produced little litigation despite the potentially high
stakes associated with a term that could allow the buyer to cancel or renegotiate a large transaction.
The calm in acquisition practice has been shattered in recent years. Litigation over MACs and
MAEs has become prominent.5 In its wake, the negotiation of these clauses has become contested and
their length has exploded. The professional literature also has expanded dramatically. This change –
the promotion of MACs and MAEs from the M & A chorus to center stage – provides the motivation
for our paper.
We attempt to make three contributions. Our primary goal is to understand the role MACs

5

See. e.g., The Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. v. Jardine Strategic Holdings Limited, Del Ch.
#31731/87 (1987 stock market crash); North Point Communications Group, Inc. v. Verizon
Communications Inc. (2000) (decline in e-commerce sector); Andrew Sorkin & Jonathan Glater,
“Merger Deals are Stalled Amid Doubt: Attack May be Invoked to Cancel Agreements, NY Times, p.
C1, column 11 (Sept. 17, 2001) (impact of September 11th).
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play in the structure of an acquisition agreement. We will argue that the traditional MAC form6
completes the transactional structure that constrains seller moral hazard. In the same vein, we hope to
explain the change in MAC practice; that is, to identify the factors that account for the new efforts to
resolve the ambiguities inherent in the traditional MAC formulation through detailed drafting. Two
hypotheses could account both for the traditional role of MACs and for changes in MAC practice. The
first, which we call the symmetry hypothesis, is driven by changes in corporate law that have
accentuated the resemblance of the seller’s interest in an executed but not yet closed transaction to a
put option. The second, which we call the investment hypothesis, is driven by the implications of a
seller’s ability to make relation-specific investments during the post-execution/pre-closing period that
would affect the post-closing value of the new, combined company. We sometimes refer to the seller’s
actions as synergy investments. These are lost when deals fail to close, but do not necessarily reduce a
seller’s stand alone value beyond the wasted resources themselves. In some recently expanding
industries, however, wasted synergy investments could have a value reducing effect, thereby heightening
the significance of terms such as the MAC that permit the buyer to exit costlessly. As we will see, the
symmetry and investment hypotheses yield different predictions about the nature of the recent change in
MAC practice: the symmetry hypothesis predicts an expansion of the circumstances that would permit
a buyer not to close a transaction; the investment hypothesis predicts a contraction of those
circumstances. Our data reject the symmetry hypothesis. This paper’s second contribution is to
explore the implications of our explanations for the drafting of MAC clauses and for their judicial

6

We define a MAC as “traditional” if the acquisition agreement omits to set out explicit
exceptions to the acquirer’s right to cancel in the event of a material adverse change or effect.
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interpretation.
Finally, we focus on the contract theory implications of the MAC term. Parties commonly
reject contract law’s standards in favor of contractual rules.7 MACs thus are interesting from a
contract theory point of view because the traditional MAC is a contractual standard -- a “material
adverse change” -- while recent changes in drafting practice have made MACs more rule like. We will
argue that the investment theory of MACs explains both the apparent oddity of the traditional MAC
and the reversion of MAC and MAE clauses to the more rule-like “contracting mean”.
In Part 2, we describe the role that MACs and MAEs play in the structure of the standard
acquisition agreement and we frame the competing symmetry and investment theory explanations both
for the existence of a traditional MAC term and for the recent change in its formulation – from the
general to the particular. Part 3 contains a simple model of the investment theory that attempts to
illuminate its corporate and contract theory implications. Part 4 next reports the results of our empirical
analysis: Despite the real change in the character of the acquiring company’s interest in an executory
acquisition agreement, the data are inconsistent with the symmetry theory. Rather than observing a
broadening of the acquirer’s right to walk away from the transaction as a result of a change in the value
of a target’s business, we see the opposite: a shift in risk from the target to the acquirer through an
increasingly detailed list of changes in the target’s business that will not permit the acquirer to exit. We

7

A standard specifies permitted or prohibited actions ex post. Thus, requiring the buyer to
object to a defective tender in a “reasonable time after delivery” is a standard; requiring the buyer to
object within ten business days is a rule. The ratio of standards to rules in contract law is very high.
See Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, “Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law”,
forthcoming, 113 Yale L. J.541 (2003).
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then offer an explanation for this change in the form that MACs and MAEs take: an increase in
exogenous and undiversifiable risk that would be inefficiently borne by the seller were merger
agreements not to allocate the risk to buyers. Part 5 briefly considers the implications of our analysis
for judicial interpretation of MAC clauses and for their drafting, and Part 6 concludes.
2. The changing structure and function of the standard acquisition agreement.
2.1. The role of closing conditions in a corporate acquisition agreement.
Three sets of provisions reflect the three basic transactional engineering elements of a corporate
acquisition agreement: representations and warranties, covenants, and conditions. Representations and
warranties specify what the buyer acquires. These provisions warrant, as of the date of the acquisition
agreement, such matters as the accuracy of the target’s financial statements; the absence of liabilities for
taxes or other matters accruing after the date of the target’s most recently audited financial statements,
including contingent liabilities; the ownership and condition of assets, including intellectual property,
important to the operation of the target’s business; the absence of pending or threatened litigation
against the target; and the absence of problems in particularly important areas, such as environmental
and pensions. When an acquisition agreement is executed and closed simultaneously, the agreement
need contain little more than a warranties and representations article.8 The other two elements of the
transactional triumvirate – covenants and conditions – are irrelevant when there is no temporal gap

8

Other subjects, such as the contractual statute of limitations that specifies whether and for how
long representations and warranties survive the closing and provisions regarding claims for breach like
“baskets” and “caps”, would still demand attention. A basket is the minimum amount that the buyer’s
claims must sum to before the claims can be asserted. A cap is the seller’s maximum liability for
breaches of the representations and warranties term.
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between execution and closing.
More commonly, a significant temporal gap will exist. A regulatory regime may require delay.
For example, the regime may require a shareholder vote so that a proxy statement must be prepared
and filed with the SEC. The consideration for the merger may be issuer securities whose offer must be
registered under the Securities Act of 1933. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Premerger Notification Act may
require a filing and a waiting period. Agency approval of the transaction may be required, as with a
bank merger. Delay also may reflect regulatory convenience, as when the parties seek a revenue ruling
from the IRS concerning the deal’s tax consequences. Finally, delay may result from the nature of the
transaction itself; due diligence for some deals can take considerable time. As a consequence of these
factors, mergers seldom close within 90 days of execution of the acquisition agreement, and are
sometimes delayed for as long as a year.
Covenants and conditions bridge the temporal gap between execution and closing. Covenants
require or prohibit particular verifiable actions, such as complying with regulations or not declaring an
unusual dividend. Conditions specify the circumstances that, when absent, permit the acquirer not to
close.
Two conditions are of particular significance, and both respond to a hidden action concern. To
understand the concern, realize that a seller typically has available to it a set of post-execution actions
that would reduce the probability that the value of the proposed new corporate combination would fall
in the interim between signing the acquisition agreement and closing the deal. Certain of these seller
actions could affect specific and verifiable aspects of the target company’s business. As examples, the
failure to maintain a factory or to police pollution emissions could result in a decline in the factory’s
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value or an increase in the target (and therefore the acquiring) firm’s environmental liabilities. The
warranties and representations term ensures that the factory is in satisfactory shape and the
environmental liabilities are sufficiently low when the deal is executed. The “bring down” condition
discharges the buyer’s obligation to close if the seller’s representations and warranties are not true and
correct on the closing date as well as on the execution date. This condition thus creates an incentive for
the seller to maintain the factory and to police its emissions during the gap between execution and
closing.
The MAC condition relates to that subset of seller actions that also would reduce the likelihood
of a low value realization for the new company if not taken, even if the actions do not itself breach the
bring down condition. The particular effect of not taking these actions, or of taking them badly, cannot
conveniently be described in a contract, however. These difficult to describe actions relate to seller
investments in integration -- i.e., in synergy -- the effective pursuit of which would reduce the likelihood
that the post-closing combined entity would turn out to be worth less than the parties anticipated at deal
time. The standard acquisition agreement, we argue, creates an incentive for the seller to invest in
synergy by permitting the buyer to exit if the target’s business suffers a “material adverse change”, or
experiences an event that results in a “material adverse effect”, on a litany of target characteristics,
including the target’s business, its financial condition and the results of its operations.9

9

The MAC term also can be drafted to extend the time period covered by the representations
and warranties. Because the current value of the target’s business is the discounted present value of
future cash flows, a change occurring in the post-closing/pre-execution period that affects future cash
flows would affect the current value of the business, and thus may give the buyer with MAC protection
a right not to close even if the express warranties only spoke to current values. This timing issue has
been addressed in litigation over whether a simple reference to “business” is sufficient to give the MAC

9
Finally, there is a question whether a MAC would permit a buyer not to close if a value change
occurred in consequence of an exogenous event rather than because of an action that the target took or
failed to take. The traditional MAC formulation is ambiguous regarding exogenous risk. As an
example of the issue, the bring down condition will be satisfied if a company’s backlog is the same at
closing as at the deal’s signing. But suppose the target manufactures military helicopters and that, in the
interim between signing and closing, the Defense Department announces a new policy that will substitute
planes for helicopters in providing support for attacking troops. The new policy would materially
reduce the expected
gain from a merger with the target -- future cash flows would decrease because of a decrease in future
orders -- but neither party could have affected the policy’s adoption. As we will see, whether parties
intend the MAC to impose such an exogenous risk on the seller or the buyer will permit us to distinguish
between the symmetry and investment theories.
2.2 Explanations for MACs and changes in MAC practice.
2.2.1 The symmetry theory: the MAC as an offsetting option.
Parties to friendly acquisitions did not worry seriously about hostile competing bids before the
1980s.10 Economic and legal changes in the 1980s altered this happy state (that is, happy for everyone
but the shareholders of targets). The capital market and transaction technology evolved such that
financing for a competing bid could be raised before a friendly transaction could be closed, thus making
term a forward looking character, or whether an additional term like “prospects” is necessary.
10

For an early recognition of the effect of a hostile competitive bid on the structure of a friendly
deal see Freund and Easton, “The Three-Piece Suitor: An Alternative Approach to Negotiated
Corporate Acquisitions”, 34 Business Law. 1679 (1979).
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real the requirement that target shareholders approve the transaction. 11 A set of Delaware cases also
established that target managers were required to accept the highest bid, regardless of their preference
for the friendly acquirer. Indeed, the managers were required to seek out the highest bid.12 In a later
round of cases, the courts further restricted the ability of parties to a friendly deal to prevent the target
from considering competing bids by agreeing in the acquisition agreement to “no shop” or “no talk”
clauses.13 The result of these economic and legal innovations was to enable the seller always to accept
a higher competing bid or to compel a renegotiation of the price; acquisitions require target shareholder
approval, whether explicitly by vote or implicitly by tender, and the target shareholders would refuse
consent to an initial offer in the face of another buyer’s higher bid.
On the symmetry theory, the ability of the seller to go elsewhere, when fully appreciated, would
have seriously curtailed acquisition activity in the absence of a MAC. To see why, realize that a friendly
acquirer is bound by the acquisition agreement it had signed while the target is not bound (its
shareholders could refuse consent), and target management is legally required to attempt to improve on

11

These developments are explained in Ronald J. Gilson,. “Catalyzing Corporate Governance:
The Evolution of the U.S. System in the 1980s” in The Ecology of Corporate Governance (T. Heller
and M. Klausner, eds., forthcoming 2004).
12

See MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. S. Ct. 1986); Mills Acquisition
Company v. Macmillan, 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. S. Ct. 1989); Paramount Communications v. QVS
Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. S. Ct. 1993).
13

See. e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., 1999 WL 1054255 (Del.
Chancery, Sept. 27, 1999); Ace Limited v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A2d 95 (Del. Chancery 1999).
Most recently, the Delaware Supreme Court cast substantial doubt on a target company’s ability to
commit absolutely to a bidder even after a full and fair auction. Omnicare v. NCS. Healthcare, Inc.,
822 A.2d 397 (2003).
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the buyer’s offer.14 If the seller’s value at closing time, either to the buyer or to another acquirer, is
above the bid price, the seller would either renegotiate the bid price or exit to accept a better offer. If
the seller’s ex post value were below the bid price, the seller in a contract without a MAC would make
the original deal. The buyer thus would bear the full cost of low realizations but receive only part of the
gain (or no gain) from high realizations.
A seller functioning in this economic and legal environment has an incentive to offer a MAC to
potential buyers. A broadly drafted MAC would increase a buyer’s expected gain from an acquisition,
and this would increase the likelihood that the seller would receive bids. Just as the seller would exit if
its value turned out to be above the bid price, the buyer now would exit if the seller’s value turned out
to be below. Transaction costs would keep the seller in the deal if its value turned out to be slightly high
and would keep the buyer in the deal if value turned out to be slightly low. When the standard
acquisition agreement has a traditional MAC, the acquirer thus no longer commits to purchase the
bottom half of a probability distribution, but instead only commits to purchase if the realized value is
close to the negotiated price.
This symmetry theory has a testable implication. To create a call for the buyer that is symmetric
to the put the Delaware courts gave to the target, the formulation of the MAC term should shift to the
target the risk of exogenously caused reductions in the value of the new corporate combination. In

14

In many cases, approval requirements for an acquisition are asymmetric as between the seller
and the buyer. The seller’s shareholders must approve the transaction because it involves the
elimination of the seller as an independent firm. The buyer’s shareholders typically need not consent,
however, unless the transaction involves the issuance of more than 20% of the buyer’s stock. Thus, the
buyer’s board commonly can make a binding offer to purchase.

12
particular, by the late 1980s the MAC clause would clarify the traditional formulation by specifying that
the existence of such value reducing factors as unfavorable economic conditions in the general economy
or in the target’s industry would permit the acquirer not to close.15
2.2.2. The investment theory.
The investment theory rests on the ability of a seller, in the post-execution/pre-closing period, to
make relation specific investments that will affect the value of the combined company. These
investments fall into three categories. Initially, the success of an acquisition may depend on early efforts
to facilitate integration, for example because the acquisition is motivated by the potential for postclosing synergy.16 Getting a head start on integration could then be valuable, especially in competitive
industries that experience rapid technological change. In such industries, the merger announcement,
rather than the closing, will trigger a competitive response. As examples of investment, the target
company may begin the process of integrating its product line with that of the acquirer by suspending or
canceling development or improvement of existing products; may freeze investment in capabilities that
15

The buyer’s disadvantageous position under an acquisition agreement without a MAC
apparently could be reflected in a lower price; the market, that is, could price the seller’s put option.
Pricing real options that are not regularly traded can be difficult, however, which suggests that the MAC
may be a more convenient solution. Nevertheless, the symmetry theory has a theoretical gap. A buyer
can protect itself against the risk that the seller will abandon the deal when value has risen by taking a
toehold stake in the seller or by obtaining a break up fee. See generally Ronald J. Gilson, “Seeking
Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defenses”, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 51 (1982). The
positive role of break up fees in inducing bidder entry is analyzed in Thomas W. Bates and Michael L.
Lemmon, “Breaking Up is Hard to Do? An Analysis of Termination Fee Provisions and Merger
Outcomes”, 69 J. Financial Econ. 469 (2003). Thus, the parties’ decision to protect the buyer by
creating a call option requires further explanation. We focus here on the empirical implications of the
theory.
16

Synergy as an acquisition motive is discussed in Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard S. Black, The
Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions, Chapter 8 (2d ed. 1995).
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the acquirer already possesses; may shift its research and development to fit the anticipated postclosing strategic plan; and may discuss with its customers the buyer’s capabilities in markets where the
buyer has been a competitor.
The second investment category comprises efforts by the target company to retain the
cohesiveness of its work force. The announcement of a friendly transaction could lead employees to
suspect lay-offs or unwanted changes in the work environment. These expectations could cause more
mobile, and likely more valuable, employees to become less focused on the target and more focused on
their own futures, with the potential of an adverse selection cascade.

The third investment

category focuses on seller efforts to preserve the expected profitability of the new enterprise. A target
firm’s customers and suppliers may reconsider their relations with the target in anticipation of the postclosing situation. Also, competitors may attempt to exploit these uncertainties. The failure of a seller to
expend effort in retaining a work force and in preserving relations with customers and suppliers in the
sometimes lengthy interim between execution and closing thus could materially reduce the value of the
new company.17
Certain of the actions that a seller could take share a common characteristic: they may
materially reduce the target’s stand alone value if the deal fails to close. This is particularly true of
investments in integration, where the target may reveal information to the buyer that the buyer, or other

17

The model in Part 3 below uses the phrase “investment” to refer to actions the seller can take
to prevent the loss of employees, customers and opportunities. The bring down condition does not
create an incentive for a seller to take all of these actions. As examples, a seller seldom warrants the
continued existence of business opportunities or covenants that it will take actions to mesh its R & D
program with that of the buyer.
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firms, could use to the seller’s disadvantage. In addition, the competitive cost of strategic steps
undertaken in expectation of closing but with negative consequences for the target if the transaction
does not close could be substantial in some industries.18
The investment theory follows from this story. Regarding the intuition – the model is set out
below – suppose that an acquisition agreement lacks a MAC, and that the value of the proposed
corporate combination turns out to be higher at closing time than it was at execution time. The ability of
the seller to cancel at will permits a seller to threaten exit in order to renegotiate the price upward. The
seller thus has an incentive to take value increasing actions. Alternatively, suppose that the combined
company turns out to have a value at closing time that is below the merger price. The seller will then
enforce the deal at that price, and so lacks an incentive to take value preserving actions. Commonly,
the same set of actions would both preserve and increase value. Thus, the assumed acquisition

18

The post-execution/pre-closing activities in Hewlett-Packard’s acquisition of Compaq
illustrate the intensity of integration efforts and the potential risks if the transaction does not close. Prior
to closing, more than 1,000 employees of both companies devoted more than one million hours to
integration planning. Pui-Wing Tam & Scott Thurm, “Married at Last: HP, Compaq Face Real Test”,
WSJ, May 8, 2002. This effort included choosing which of the two companies’ products would
survive in each product line as well as developing three year plans for each surviving line. These
choices had obvious effects on the lines that were to be discontinued. Pui-Wing Tam, “An Elaborate
Plan Forces H-P to Stay on Target”, WSJ, April 28, 2003, p. 1,10. At the employee level, the top
three tiers of managements were selected from among the two companies’ managers well before
closing. Id. At the same time, customers of both companies were the object of intense attention from
competitors. One customer recounted that “he gets as many as five calls a week from other computer
makers. The pitches frequently aren’t subtle. ‘You may want to be aware that such-and-such H-P or
Compaq product won’t be a survivor of the deal,’ [the customer] quotes one sales representative as
saying.” Scott Thurm, Pui-Wing Tam & Gary McWilliams, “Nail Biter: HP Claims Victory on Compaq
Merger”, WSJ, March 20, 2003. To the same effect, a post-execution/pre-closing survey of Compaq
Unix customers showed that they would be “less likely” to buy from the merged company. Scott
Thurmn, “HP, Compaq Plan the Details of Their Union”, WSJ, January 25, 2002.

15
agreement would be inefficient. The agreement would permit the seller not to optimize against much of
the distribution from which the value of the new corporate combination will be drawn; rather, because
the seller is insured against low realizations, it will invest too little relative to the social optimum.
The MAC responds in a subtle way to this moral hazard problem. To see how, assume that
parties cannot contract directly on the value the new company would have because values are
unverifiable and that it is too costly to describe in a contract the full set of value preserving and
enhancing seller actions. A MAC permits the buyer to exit if the seller experiences a material adverse
“change” or “effect” in its “business or financial condition”. These changes or effects have three
characteristics: they would be verifiable if material; they correlate negatively with the value the new
corporate combination would have; and the changes or effects would be less likely to occur if the seller
took the investment actions described above.19 The effect of the MAC thus is to reduce the seller’s
insurance against low realizations. The seller’s best response is to choose an investment level that is
closer to the social optimum.20
The investment theory generates three testable predictions. First, acquisition agreements will
have had MACs before the legal developments summarized in Part 2.2.1. Second, MAC drafters will
resolve the ambiguity in the traditional MAC formulation by creating exceptions to the traditional MAC
19

Buyers have called MAC events, sometimes successfully, when, e.g., the seller was late with
a product development; it experienced a material shortfall in inventory; its recent revenues dropped
substantially; its operating margins declined substantially; it began to experience operating losses; it had
a negative accounting net worth in consequence of conducting (bank) mergers without using available
government assistance; it incurred large losses in consequence of a recent entry into a new market.
20

We later argue that corporate law creates efficient incentives for the buyer to invest in
synergy. This paper thus considers only seller investments when attempting to explain the content of the
standard acquisition agreement.
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that would impose exogenous risk on the buyer. Third, the incentive of parties to resolve ambiguity in
this way increases when the combination of exogenous risk and the seller’s investment could cause the
seller’s stand alone value to fall should the deal not close. Regarding the second prediction, a buyer
who could cancel for exogenous risk would renegotiate the price downward when the materialization of
exogenous risk would cause the deal to become unprofitable for it at the original price. This would
allocate more of the exogenous risk to the seller. As we will see, conditional on deals closing buyers
are better able to reduce the impact of and to insure against exogenous risk. On the assumption in our
model that the parties are risk neutral, the acquisition agreement thus should allocate the entire risk to
the buyer when the efficiency gains from this risk allocation would exceed the transaction costs of
creating MAC exceptions. Regarding the third prediction, when a MAC lacks exceptions, the
bargaining game the parties play ex post will allocate to the seller a greater share of exogenous risk
when the seller’s value would fall after a failed deal. This further reduces the efficiency of a merger
agreement without MAC exceptions, and so increases the parties’ incentive to create them.
It is helpful to make the last two predictions more concrete. The investment theory holds that
an efficient acquisition agreement will impose endogenous risk on the seller and exogenous risk on the
buyer. The need to make explicit the exogenous risk allocation should become more pressing as
exogenous risks become more severe. The increased volatility of capital and product markets in the
1990s thus suggests that explicit MAC exceptions should become more prevalent in that decade.
These exceptions would impose exogenous risk on the buyer by excluding from the definition of a
material adverse change or effect such matters as unfavorable changes in the general or industry specific
economic environment. We then extend this argument to predict that MAC exceptions should be
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especially common in connection with the acquisition of companies where human capital and
technological knowhow are critical inputs, and where technological change is rapid. Such companies,
as argued just above, are most exposed to information leakage that could aid competitors, customers
and suppliers; to anticipatory defections by employees; and to anticipatory reactions by competitors,
particularly to poach employees and customers. These companies -- technology based targets best fit
the description – will more likely suffer declines in stand alone value when deals fail.
3. A MAC model.
3.1 The model.
A risk neutral seller and a risk neutral buyer enter into a contract (d, J) at t0 for the sale of the
seller’s company, where d is the price and J is a vector of terms describing what is purchased. The
seller’s stand-alone value is denoted vT and the acquirer’s stand-alone value is denoted vA. At t1, the
seller can take an action, denoted e, that will affect the value that the proposed corporate combination
will create. The action is referred to as choosing an investment or effort level. The set of potential
actions available to the seller, and the various ways in which the actions can be performed, are
sufficiently complex so that we assume parties cannot write a contract specifying what an efficient seller
investment would be.21 The seller’s investment along with the subsequent realization of the state of the
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The contracting cost has two elements. First, it is costly (or impossible) to describe a
complex set of actions and the circumstances in which they should be undertaken. Second, it is costly
to monitor the seller to ensure that it complied with its contractual obligations. The cost of enforcing a
contract clause actually is a cost of writing it. We assume that total writing costs, so defined, are
sufficiently great as to preclude contracting directly on the seller’s investment behavior. This is a
standard assumption in contract theory models and is consistent with transactional practice. Covenants
thus will contain explicit prohibitions rather than specify a set of actions the seller is to perform.
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world (T) determine the value of the combined entity: vAT (e,T) , (0, vh), where vh is the highest
possible realized value. For convenience, we let vAT = v. If the merger turns out not to produce
surplus, then v = vA + vT , which is denoted vng.
Seller investment is stochastic. The probability that the firm will come to have a value that is less
than or equal to any realized value v is F(v(e;T)) given an effort level e. The density associated with
F(v(e;•)) is f(v(e;•)). Investment improves this distribution by reducing the likelihood of realizing low
values.22 We assume:
A1: F(v(e;T)) $ 0.
A2: The acquisition agreement does not contain a MAC, but does contain the other terms
described above.
A3: vT (e, T) = vT œ e, T.
A4: d > vT .
Because vng > 0 and A1 has v = 0 occurring with positive probability, assumption A1 permits an
acquisition to be ex post inefficient (then v < vng). Assumption A2 permits us to focus on the possible
contribution of a MAC to welfare. Assumption A3 holds that seller investments in synergy have no
effect on a seller’s stand-alone value if a deal fails to close. This assumption is made for convenience at
this stage and is relaxed in Part 3.3 below, where we discuss exogenous risk. Regarding assumption
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Formally, we suppose that

for all v , (o, vh). In other words, if e > e’,

then F(v(e;T)) strictly dominates F(v(e’;T)) in the sense of first-degree stochastic dominance. To
ensure interior solutions to optimization problems, we also make the standard assumptions that
f’(v(e;T)) > 0; f”(v(e;T)) < 0; f(v(4;T)) < 1.
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A4, that d = vT is an individual rationality constraint. We assume that d exceeds the seller’s stand-alone
value because no two targets are exactly alike, so that a target will have some bargaining power at the
negotiation stage.
At t2, the parties observe the value the combined company will have.23 The parties then decide
whether to make the deal at the original price d, to cancel the deal and renegotiate the price or to
abandon the deal. At t3, the parties conclude a deal under the original or under the renegotiated price,
or do not transact.
As shown in Part 2.2.1 above, corporate law effectively gives sellers an option not to be bound
by the acquisition agreement. Suppose then that the new company’s value turns out to be high; the
seller then will refuse to ratify the deal. This wipes the slate clean legally; the seller is not bound and the
buyer need not pay the price d. If an acquisition would be ex post efficient, however, there is surplus to
share, so the parties will renegotiate. We model renegotiation as a Nash bargaining game with
disagreement points that function as threat points: the parties’ bargaining weights are denoted "A (for
the acquirer) and "T (for the seller), with "A + "T = 1.24 The renegotiation surplus is denoted s where
s = v - (vA + vT ) = v - vng. Hence, if the target calls the deal off and renegotiates, it will receive the new
price dr = vT + "T s, while if the target lets the deal stand its payoff is the original price d. A seller thus
will renegotiate when dr > d. We let vm denote the value for the new company that makes this
23

Values are assumed to be observable but not verifiable. The motivation for assuming a lack of
verifiability is the large expense and considerable time that it takes to value sizable companies in judicial
proceedings.
24

This game, which is commonly used in the contract theory literature, requires each party to
receive a payoff that equals the payoff of its next best option plus an exogenously determined share of
the surplus that remains after the disagreement payoffs have been made.
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expression an equality.
This analysis implies that the combined company’s value can fall within five ranges. If despite
seller investment v < vng is realized, the deal is ex post inefficient. Both society and the buyer would like
the merger to be canceled. If value is between vng and vh, the deal is ex post efficient and should be
concluded. If value is between vng and d + vA , however, the buyer would cancel if it could; a deal at d
would cause it to incur a loss.25 If target value turns out to be between d + vA and vm, the parties will
voluntarily complete the merger at the contract price: the buyer would earn a positive profit and the
seller prefers the price to renegotiation. 26 Finally, if value is above vm, the seller calls the deal off and
renegotiates. These five ranges are illustrated in Figure 1, where the values are of the new corporate
combination.
Figure 1
/0

/ vng

/d

/d + vA

/vm

/vh

Remark 1: A seller’s investment could increase value in two ways. First, though the seller’s
investment is specific to a combination with the buyer, the seller’s actions could reveal that it would be a
good merger partner for other companies. This will increase the likelihood of receiving outside offers
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The buyer breaks even when the difference between the value of the combined company and
the buyer’ stand-alone value – the buyer’s gain – equals the price. The buyer thus loses money when v
- vA < d, which implies that the buyer prefers cancellation when v < d + vA.
26

Note that vm > d + vA. To see why, recall that the seller accepts the deal at the contract
price whenever d > vT + "T (s). Recalling that s = v - vng and substituting the buyer’s break even point
of d + vA for v, this inequality reduces to d > vT , which holds by assumption. Thus, the seller always
accepts the deal when the realized value equals the buyer’s break even point, while vm is defined as the
realized value at which the seller is indifferent between acceptance and renegotiation.
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and so increase the seller’s value. Second, the seller’s actions could increase the expected revenue the
proposed corporate combination would earn. In either case, the seller in the model will renegotiate
when the new company’s value would exceed vm.
Remark 2: Buyers can take two kinds of value affecting actions in the interval between signing
a deal and closing it. One kind would protect the new company against exogenous risk. We defer
discussion of this action category to Part 3.3 below. The second category is comprised of investments
in synergy that can prevent declines in (and may increase) the value of the new company. Nevertheless,
we model synergy as an investment problem that only the seller faces for two reasons: (a) The buyer
has an incentive to delay investing in synergy until after the deal closes; (b) Corporate law gives the
buyer appropriate incentives to invest when its investments are best made in the post-execution/preclosing period, so there is no need to motivate the buyer by contract.
Regarding reason (a), the buyer can invest in synergy before or after the deal closes. If a
buyer’s pre-closing actions would increase the value of the new company sufficiently, the seller would
cancel and renegotiate. Since the seller would have bargaining power in the renegotiation, the buyer
could not realize the full return from successful pre-closing synergy investments. Therefore, unless short
term discount rates were high, the buyer does better delaying investment to the post-closing period,
where it then could capture the full return. Regarding reason (b), investment by a party in the model is
motivated by the ability of the other party to exit. As we will see, a contract term is needed to give the
buyer this right, but corporate law permits the seller always to exit so no contract term is needed.
3.2. The effect of MACs on investment.
The initial question is what investment level the seller should choose from a social point of view.
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As we assume no externalities, the social surplus from a deal is s = v - vng. First-best efficiency
requires:
(i) A deal should close if and only if v $ vng.
(ii) The seller should choose the effort level e*, where

The first order condition for a social maximum is

where subscripts denote partial derivatives. Thus, ve(e,T) =

.

An acquisition agreement without a MAC will not create first best investment incentives for two
reasons. First, the seller does not have all the bargaining power in the renegotiation game; thus, it
cannot capture the full return from investment. Second, the contract sets a floor of the price d under the
seller’s possible payoffs. If realized value is in the range vng ... vm, the seller will enforce the deal at the
price d.27 The seller’s problem thus is to choose e to maximize

27

We defer to Part 3.4 the case when a deal would be ex post inefficient (v < vng).
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The term in large braces is the seller’s expected payoff in the high value state, when the seller calls the
deal off and renegotiates; the second term is the expected value of receiving the price d when the seller
lets the deal stand; and the third term is the effort level the seller chooses. The seller’s first order
condition for a maximum thus is

The left hand side of expression (2) is smaller than the left hand side of expression (1) because the
integrand is over a smaller range and because the seller’s renegotiation payoff, dr, is less than the value
of the combined company v. The seller thus will choose a lower level of investment without a MAC
than is socially optimal. This result obtains for two reasons: the seller cannot capture the full gain from
high realizations because it has less than all of the bargaining power; and the fixed price contract insures
the seller against low realizations.
A contract with a MAC will improve the seller’s investment incentives by lowering the floor
under the seller’s payoffs in bad states. When the new company’s realized value is in the range vng to d
+ vA, the buyer will use the MAC to cancel the deal. The parties will then renegotiate. The seller will
receive a share of the ex post value of the combined company, but the expected value of this, by
definition, is less than the original price d. Hence, the seller now bears part of the cost from low
realizations.
Formally, when the merger agreement has a MAC the seller chooses e to maximize
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The second term in the first set of brackets is the seller’s expected payoff when value turns out to be in
the range vng to d + vA, the buyer uses the MAC to exit and the parties then renegotiate the price. The
second bracketed term is the expected value of receiving the price d. The seller’s first order condition
for a maximum with a MAC becomes

The left hand side of (3) is larger than the left hand side of (2), thereby implying that the seller has a
greater incentive to invest when the contract has a MAC than when it does not. With a MAC the seller
is “insured” over a smaller part of the possible return space and at risk over a larger portion of that
space. As a consequence, the seller’s incentive to invest is increased. This reasoning yields
Proposition 1: A MAC increases to a level that is closer to the socially optimal level the seller’s
investments in synergy in the post-execution/pre-closing period.
Remark 3: A seller’s incentive to invest would improve if the seller could make a take it or
leave it offer to the buyer at the ex post bargaining stage. The contract theory literature exhibits
mechanisms that permit such offers28. We exclude these mechanisms from consideration because they

28

See Hart and Moore, “Foundations of Incomplete Contracts”, 66 Rev. Econ. Studies (1999),
and Maskin and Tirole, “Unforseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts”, 66 Rev. Econ. Studies
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are not robust to renegotiation under the contract law rules that now obtain. 29
Remark 4: The MAC permits the buyer to exit in the event of a low realization, and this exit
right motivates the seller to invest to reduce the likelihood of these realizations. Corporate law permits
the seller to exit in the event of a high realization, and this exit right motivates the buyer to invest to
increase the likelihood of these realizations. This paper therefore can treat motivating synergy
investment as a problem that only the seller faces when attempting to explain the content of the standard
acquisition agreement.
Remark 5: The traditional MAC is an unusual term from a contract theory point of view
because it is a standard (“material adverse change”) rather than a rule. Standards are less costly for
parties to create than rules.30 Contracting parties, however, commonly prefer to create rules when the
discretion that a standard confers would provide an opportunity for moral hazard. For example,
section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code permits a seller to avoid a contract if its performance
“has been made impractical by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a
basic assumption on which the contract was made ....” A seller for whom a contract has turned out
badly has an incentive to breach in the hope that the vagueness of this standard would permit it to avoid

(1999).
29

Law reforms could authorize courts to enforce no renegotiation terms (see Schwartz and
Scott, supra note 7) and Schwartz and Watson, “The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting”,
forthcoming, 20 Journal of Law, Economics and Organization (2004), or could permit parties to deter
renegotiation by imposing penalties. See Edlin and Schwartz, “Optimal Penalties in Contracts”, 78
Chicago Kent Law Review 33 (2003).
30

It is easier to tell a party to behave “reasonably” than to tell the party just what it should do.
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liability. Parties routinely respond by contracting out of section 2-615 in favor of writing precise force
majure clauses. In contrast, here the party with discretion has appropriate incentives. The MAC, that
is, permits the buyer to exit when realized value is low, and it is the buyer’s credible threat so to act that
improves the seller’s incentive to invest. Parties to acquisition agreements thus can realize the virtues of
a standard without increasing their incentive to engage in moral hazard.
3.3 Exogenous risk and MAC exceptions.
Nether party, by definition, can affect whether an exogenous value affecting risk will materialize.
The buyer is the more efficient risk bearer, however. To see why, it is helpful first to note that if
exogenous events cause the value of the corporate combination to fall below the parties’ stand alone
values (v < vng), the buyer will exit regardless of what the contract provides.31 Hence, the parties’
problem is to allocate exogenous risk for states of the world in which the deal is ex post efficient and
thus will close.
A risk whose materialization cannot be prevented should be assigned to the party who can most
conveniently insure or take value preserving actions. Both parties in our model perhaps could affect
exogenous risk during the period between executing and closing a deal. The seller’s corporate law right
to exit creates an incentive for the buyer to take risk affecting actions in this period, and the buyer’s
contract right to exit under a traditional MAC creates an incentive for the seller to act. Only the buyer
can take risk affecting actions after a closing, however. Also, the buyer can capture the full gain from

31

The parties’ actions when a deal would be ex post inefficient are considered in Part 3.4

below.
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actions whose effects will be realized after the seller is paid.32 An efficient acquisition agreement
therefore would impose on the buyer those exogenous risks whose impact would largely be felt after
the buyer takes control of the new enterprise. An obvious example is the risk that the law regulating the
new entity would change. Another example is a recession in the parties’ industry. The impact of a
typical recession likely extends beyond the interim between signing an acquisition agreement and closing
the deal. Also, the effect of typical buyer responses– e.g., positioning the company for an economic
upturn – ordinarily would be realized after the deal closes. The buyer’s greater ability to respond to
long term exogenous risk and the buyer’s good incentives to do so imply the efficiency of allocating
these risks to buyers.33
Relating this reasoning to the MAC term, exogenous risk makes relevant two possible states of
the world. First, the realization of exogenous risk reduces the value of the new company, but value
would still be high enough to permit the buyer to make a positive profit at the transaction price d. In
this event, the MAC’s risk allocation would not matter because the deal would close at d and the buyer
would bear the full cost of the exogenous change or effect. This gives the buyer an incentive to take
value preserving or insuring actions. Second, the materialization of exogenous risk causes the value of
the new company to fall such that the buyer would incur a loss if it bought at the deal price. If the
MAC imposed exogenous risk on the buyer, it again would pay d; as a consequence, the buyer would
optimize against more of the return distribution that exogenous risk could generate.

32

See Remark 2 above.

33

In Commercial Law, exogenous risk commonly is allocated to the party that has control of the
goods. See, e.g., Uniform Commercial Code §2-509 allocating the risk of loss or destruction of the
goods to the seller in the period after the contract is made but before tender of delivery.
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In contrast, if the seller bore exogenous risk, the buyer would cancel the deal when it would
otherwise incur a loss, and the parties then would renegotiate to split the deal’s surplus s.34 The
renegotiation price would be dr = vT + "T s < d because the buyer could not make a profit at the
original price. Renegotiation thus would impose part of the exogenous risk on the seller. Anticipating
this outcome, the buyer would not optimize against a material portion of the return distribution that
exogenous risk could produce. Since the buyer is the more efficient risk bearer, the buyer would be
investing too little in risk cushioning or insuring activities. This analysis predicts that parties would clarify
the traditional MAC formulation by allocating long lasting exogenous risks to the buyer – impose more
of the return distribution on it – when the efficiency loss from a traditional MAC would exceed
transaction costs.
We can extend this analysis to the case where the failure of a deal to close would reduce the
seller’s stand-alone value. Again consider the case where the materialization of exogenous risk would
cause the value of the new company to fall below the buyer’s break even point. If the parties fail to
conclude a deal, the buyer’s stand-alone value would remain vA but the seller’s stand alone value now
is assumed to fall to vT - )vT . The surplus from doing the deal thus would increase to s+ = v + )vT vng > s. Therefore, when the agreement contains an unqualified MAC and the buyer cancels to initiate a
renegotiation, the renegotiation price will be below, by the amount "T )vT , the renegotiation price
calculated above, when a deal’s failure was assumed not to affect the seller’s stand alone-value. The
seller now bears more exogenous risk than before and the buyer’s incentive to take value cushioning
activities correspondingly diminishes. Put another way, when a failed deal would cause the seller’s
34

Recall that the surplus is s = v - vng, where vng is the sum of the parties’ stand alone values.
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stand alone-value to fall, the width of the value distribution against which the buyer should optimize has
widened, but a traditional MAC could not appropriately increase the buyer’s incentive to act. The
efficiency loss from an unqualified MAC thus is largest in the value reduction case, so MAC exceptions
are more likely to be seen there. We summarize this reasoning in
Proposition 2: Transaction costs aside, it is efficient for the standard acquisition agreement to allocate
endogenous risk to the seller and exogenous risk to the buyer – to contain a traditional MAC qualified
by a set of MAC exceptions.
Remark 5: The likelihood that MAC exceptions are present in an acquisition agreement should
be higher in industries where the failure of a deal to close would result in a fall in the seller’s stand-alone
value. For the reasons given in Part 2.2.2 above, technology mergers will most often fulfill this
condition.
Remark 6: MAC exceptions should more closely resemble rules than standards. The
phraseology of the traditional MAC arguably comprehends both endogenous and exogenous risk. This
ambiguity is best clarified by rules. In addition, the materialization of an exogenous risk that would
materially lower the long term value of a corporate combination often would be verifiable. Thus, parties
could contract on such risks.
3.4. MACs and ex post efficiency.
The model in Part 3 assumed that the seller’s investment would not affect its stand-alone value;
and since the buyer did not invest, this assumption implied that the ex post value of the proposed new
company would always equal or exceed vng, the sum of the parties’ stand-alone values. We now
consider the possibility that the new company’s value turns out to be below vng.

In this event, a
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MAC efficiently reduces the buyer’s exit cost relative to the buyer’s contract law rights. If there were
no MAC and the buyer breached, the seller could not prove market damages because these would be
the difference between the contract price and the target’s stand-alone value and, we assume, values are
unverifiable. In such cases, however, courts routinely award specific performance, which would require
the buyer to pay d. The buyer would complete the deal when v $ vng and purchase the right to exit
otherwise. In the latter case, the “breach surplus” – the loss from performance that breach would avoid
– is vng - v. The buyer could exit by paying the price d and a share of this surplus. Therefore,
renegotiation yields ex post efficiency under contract law.
A MAC also generates only efficient performances, but where no exceptions apply, the buyer
could cancel whenever v < d. The parties will renegotiate to perform when v $vng and let the
cancellation stand otherwise. When performance would be inefficient, then, the buyer’s exit price when
the agreement has a MAC is zero. Therefore, while the parties’ ability to avoid inefficient deals is
unaffected by whether the agreement has a MAC, efficiency is achieved under a MAC at lower cost.
This relaxes buyer participant constraints and thus increases the set of value increasing deals parties can
do. We can summarize this logic with
Proposition 3: Parties will conclude only ex post efficient deals, whether the standard acquisition
agreement contains a MAC or not, but MACs relax buyer participation constraints relative to contract
law.
4. Data and analysis.
The symmetry and investment theories support different hypotheses regarding MACs:
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H1S:35 The traditional MAC clause – a term without exceptions – should become prevalent
after 1985.
H1I: The traditional MAC clause should have been used long before 1985.
H2S: MAC exceptions should impose on sellers the risk of exogenously caused declines in the
value of the new corporate combination.
H2I(1): MAC exceptions should impose on buyers those exogenous risks whose impact
would be felt most strongly after a deal closes.
H2I(2): MAC exceptions should be more prevalent in industries in which human capital is
a significant asset and technological change is rapid.
These hypotheses have been motivated in Part 2.2 above. To summarize briefly, the symmetry
theory cannot account for the early existence of MACs because the term functions in the theory only to
create an offsetting call to the seller’s put option. That option became significant in consequence of
economic and legal developments that took place in the 1980s. In our view, by contrast, MACs should
always have been present because they function to encourage the seller to take affirmative actions that
would preserve (or increase) the value that the parties expect the new enterprise to have. This explains
the two H1 hypotheses. Regarding H2, under the symmetry theory the seller should bear exogenous
risk because this makes the buyer’s offsetting call option more effective. Under the investment theory,
there is no need to impose exogenous risk on the seller, and since the buyer is a more efficient risk
bearer than the seller, the buyer should bear this risk. Moreover, the gains to the parties from imposing
exogenous risk on the seller are more likely to exceed contracting costs when synergy investments in a
35

Subscripts denote theories. Thus, H1 S is the initial hypothesis of the symmetry theory.
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deal that fails to close could reduce the target’s stand-alone value. For the reasons given above, these
are the industries to which H2I(2) refers.
Systematic data on MACs for the years before 1980 is difficult to get. Our impressionistic
evidence, from experience and memory, lawyer interviews and the professional literature36, suggests
that the traditional MAC was widely used in the pre-1980 era, and we are aware of no evidence to the
contrary. This record, though unsystematic, is consistent with the investment theory.
We were able to test H2 more systematically. The set of acquisition agreements on which we
report below are insufficient to refute conclusively either theory. Rather, the data is suggestively
inconsistent with the symmetry hypotheses and suggestively supports the investment hypotheses. This
evidence, together with the theory Part 3 develops, cause us to conclude that the investment story best
explains the presence of MACs in acquisition agreements and the form that MACs take.
To secure contracts, we downloaded from the Securities and Exchange Commission’s EDGAR
site random samples of acquisitions announced in 1993, 1995 and 2000. These samples included the
terms “material adverse change”,“material adverse event” or both. We then asked whether the
traditional MAC formulation – no material adverse change in the business, financial condition, or results
of operations – was modified by explicit inclusions or exclusions from the generic formulation. The
acquisition agreements were coded for the presence of the following categories of events: (1) changes
in global economic conditions; 2) changes in U.S. economic conditions; (3) changes in global stock,
capital or financial market conditions; (4) changes in U.S. stock, capital or financial market conditions;
(5) changes in the economic conditions of other regions; (6) changes in the target company’s industry;
36

See Freund, supra note 4.
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(7) changes in applicable laws or regulations; (8) changes in the target company’s stock price; (9) loss
of customers, suppliers or employees; (10) changes due to the agreement or the transaction itself; and a
(11) a miscellaneous category. The agreements also were coded for two qualifications to the explicit
inclusions or exclusions of the traditional MAC definition. These qualifications would make a specified
inclusion or exclusion inapplicable if the MAC either specifically affected the target company or had a
materially disproportionate effect on the target company.37
A preliminary analysis of the data from the three sample years appears in Tables One -Three.
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This exception to MAC exceptions apparently rests on the view that the seller can cushion the
shock of an exogenous change that would affect it but not similar firms, or that would affect it
disproportionally. Such risks therefore seem more endogenous than exogenous.
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TABLE ONE

Year

# of
Trans.

% (#)
with
one or
more
MAC
Exlus.

Types of Exclusions *
(a)

(b)

(c)

% (#)
Global
Econ.
Cond.

%(#)
U.S. or
General
Econ.
Cond.

% (#)
Global
Stock/
Capital
Market
Cond.

(d)
% (#)
U.S.
Stock/
Capital
Market
Cond.

(e)
% (#)
Other
Region
Econ.
Cond.

(f)

(g)

% (#)
Target
Industry
Cond.

% (#)
Change
in Law
or Reg.

1993

60

18.33
(11)

0

10.0
(6)

0

1.67
(1)

0

5.00
(3)

3.33
(2)

1995

63

31.74
(20)

0

10.00
(6)

0

1.67
(1)

0

5.00
(3)

3.33
(2)

2000

100

83.0
(83)

11.0
(11)

64.0
(64)

9.0
(9)

38.0
(38)

7.0
(7)

71.0
(72)

25.0
(25)

*

Totals more than 100%
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Year

# of
Trans.

% (#)
with
one or
more
MAC
Exlus.

Qualifications **

Types of Exclusions
(h)

(i)

% (#)
Target
Stock
Price

%(#)
Loss of
Customers,
Suppliers,
Employees

(j)

(k)

(a)

(b)

% (#)
Changes
due to
Agmnt. or
Transaction

%
(#)
Misc
.

% (#)
Unless
Change
Specifically
Affects
Seller

% (#)
Unless
Materially
Disproportion.
Effect on
Seller

1993

60

18.33
(11)

1.67
(1)

0

0

1.67
(1)

0

0

1995

63

31.74
(20)

0

0

4.76
(3)

14.29
(9)

0

0

2000

100

83.0
(83)

24.0
(24)

12.0
(12)

58.0
(58)

22.0
(22)

12.0
(12)

17.0
(17)

**

Qualifies applicability of exclusion; e.g.; change in U.S. conditions is not excluded if the
change specifically affects or has a materially disproportionate effect on the seller.
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TABLE TWO
Prevalence and Characteristics of MAC and MAE Exclusion for 1995 by Industry *

Industry

# of
Trans.

Avg.
# of
Excl.

%
(#)
with
one
or
more
MAC
Exl.

Types of Exclusions**
(a)

(b)

% (#)
Global
Econ.
Cond.

%(#)
U.S. or
General
Econ.
Cond.

Non-Technology

54

0.69

29.6
(16)

1.9
(1)

14.8
(8)

Technology ***

9

0.55

44.4
(4)

0

0

Total 1995

63

0.67

31.74
(20)

1.58
(1)

12.7
(8)

(c)

% (#)
Global
Stock/
Capital
Market
Cond.
0

0

0

(d)

% (#)
U.S.
Stock/
Capital
Market
Cond.

(e)

% (#)
Other
Region
Econ.
Cond.

(f)

(g)

% (#)
Target
Industry
Cond.

% (#)
Change
in Law
or Reg.

1.9
(1)

0

20.4
(11)

14.8
(8)

0

0

11.1
(1)

0

19.5
(12)

12.7
(8)

1.58
(1)

0

*

As shown in Table One, the 1993 sample had too few exclusions to warrant an industry
breakdown.
**

totals more than 100%

***

Technology is defined narrowly in this set to only include engineering, computer, biotech, and
industrial instruments, and target companies that plainly involve a high technology component. The
classification could not rely on SIC codes because in many industries, the classification depends on the
product, rather than the production technology. So, for example, internet companies were classified
based on the product they sold, rather than the technology associated with marketing.
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Industry

# of
Trans.

%
(#)
with
one
or
more
MAC
Excl.

Non-Technology

54

29.6
(16)

Technology*

9

44.4
(4)

Total 1995

63

31.74
(20)

****

Qualifications****

Types of Exclusions

(h)

(i)

(j)

(k)

(a)

(b)

% (#)
Target
Stock
Price

%(#)
Loss of
Customers,
Suppliers,
Employees

% (#)
Changes
due to
Agmnt. or
Transaction

% (#)
Misc.

% (#)
Unless
Change
Specifically
Affects
Seller

% (#)
Unless
Materially
Disproportion.
Effect on
Seller

0

0

3.7
(2)

11.1
(6)

0

0

0

11.1
(1)

33.3
(3)

0

0

0

4.76
(3)

14.29
(9)

0

0

0

0

Qualifies applicability of exclusion; e.g.; change in U.S. conditions is not excluded if the
change specifically affects or has a materially disproportionate effect on the seller.

Calculator (2).lnk
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TABLE THREE
Prevalence and Characteristics of MAC and MAE Exclusion for 2000 by Industry

Industry

# of
Trans.

Avg.
# of
Excl.

%
(#)
with
one
or
more
MAC
Exl.

Types of Exclusions*
(a)

(b)

% (#)
Global
Econ.
Cond.

%(#)
U.S. or
General
Econ.
Cond.

Non-Technology

61

3.64

80.3
(49)

14.8
(9)

59.0
(36)

Technology **

39

4.05

87.2
(34)

5.1
(2)

69.2
(27)

2000 Totals

100

3.75

83.0
(83)

11.0
(11)

64.0
(64)

(c)

% (#)
Global
Stock/
Capital
Market
Cond.

13.1
(8)

(d)

% (#)
U.S.
Stock/
Capital
Market
Cond.

(e)

% (#)
Other
Region
Econ.
Cond.

(f)

(g)

% (#)
Target
Industry
Cond.

% (#)
Change
in Law
or Reg.

47.5
(29)

4.9
(3)

70.5
(43)

34.4
(21)

23.1
(9)

21.2
(7)

10.1
(4)

71.8
(28)

10.3
(4)

9.0
(9)

38.0
(38)

71.0
(71)

25.0
(25)

7.0
(7)

*

Totals more than 100%

**

Technology is defined narrowly in this set to only include engineering, computer, biotech, and
industrial instruments, and target companies that plainly involve a high technology component. The
classification could not rely on SIC codes because in many industries, the classification depends on the
product, rather than the production technology. So, for example, internet companies were classified
based on the product they sold, rather than the technology associated with marketing.
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Industry

# of
Trans.

%
(#)
with
one
or
more
MAC
Excl.

Qualifications***

Types of Exclusions

(h)

(i)

(j)

(k)

(a)

(b)

% (#)
Target
Stock
Price

%(#)
Loss of
Customers,
Suppliers,
Employees

% (#)
Changes
due to
Agmnt. or
Transaction

% (#)
Misc.

% (#)
Unless
Change
Specifically
Affects
Seller

% (#)
Unless
Materially
Disproportion.
Effect on
Seller

Non-Technology

61

80.3
(49)

6.6
(4)

3.3
(2)

54.1
(33)

30.0
(14)

13.1
(8)

11.5
(7)

Technology*

39

87.2
(34)

48.5
(19)

25.6
(10)

64.1
(25)

20.5
(8)

10.3
(4)

25.6
(10)

2000 Totals

100

83.0
(83)

12.0
(12)

58.0
(58)

22.0
(22)

12.0
(12)

17.0
(17)

***

24.0
(24)

Qualifies applicability of exclusion; e.g.; change in U.S. conditions is not excluded if the
change specifically affects or has a materially disproportionate effect on the seller.

40

The Tables reveal a significant shift in transaction practice respecting MACs. In 1993, only 18.33% of
MAC clauses included one or more event specifications that restricted the buyer’s right to exit; more
than half of these stated a single event. In 1995, the percentage of clauses with an event specification
had increased to 31.74%, with an average of 0.67 per transaction. By 2000, event specifications had
become mainstream; 83% of the sample acquisition agreements featured at least one MAC or MAE
exclusion, with an average of 3.75 per transaction.
Table One also rejects H2 S in favor of H2I. We observe no evidence that exceptions to MAC
clauses have expanded to give acquirers an option to abandon on the occurrence of a value reducing
exogenous change to match the target company’s option to abandon on the occurrence of a value
increasing exogenous change. To the contrary, approximately two-thirds of the transactions in the
2000 sample exclude from the definition of a MAC or MAE the two most obvious examples of
exogenous risk: changes in the U.S. economy and changes in the target company’s industry.
The data also permit us to distinguish between technology and non-technology mergers for the
years 1995 and 2000.38 This evidence is consistent with H2I(2), that the change in acquisition practice
may have begun in connection with, and is more significant in, high technology acquisitions. In our
analysis, this would be because the danger of reductions in a target’s stand alone value is more serious
there. In 1995, 29.6% of non-technology acquisition agreements had one or more MAC exclusions
38

The professional literature claims a special role for MAC exclusions in high technology
transactions. See, e.g., Rodrigo J. Howard, “Allocating the Risks of Interim Changes: MACs and
MAEs in Recent Technology M & A Agreements”, in Drafting Corporate Agreements 1998-1999
(PLI 1998); Michael J. Halloran and D. Stanley Rowland, “Changes in Material Adverse Change
Provisions in High Tech Deals”, 2 No. 10 M & A Law. 12 (1999).
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while 44.4% of technology acquisitions had these exclusions. Part 2.2.2 argued that the risk of
customer, supplier or employee loss was greater in connection with high tech mergers. No agreement
in the 1995 sample excluded from the definition of a material adverse change the target company’s loss
of customers, suppliers, or employees. The 2000 data show that 3.3% of non-technology acquisition
agreements but 25.6% of technology agreements had such an exclusion.
Part 2.2.2 also argued that high tech firms would be more likely to experience a general
reduction in stand alone value from a failed deal. No agreement in the 1995 sample excluded from the
definition of a material adverse change a decline in the target company’s stock price. The 2000 data
indicate that 6.6% of non-technology acquisition agreements but 48.5% of technology acquisition
agreements had such an exclusion. Such a decline is likely if the target would lose value in consequence
of a failed deal because the market realizes that not all deals close. Moreover, the dramatic increase in
exclusions for changes in the target’s stock price is also consistent with the increasing volatility that we
earlier argued drove the shift from a standard toward rules. In short and as predicted, parties to
technology acquisition seem more inclined to restrict the buyer’s right to exit than parties to acquisitions
generally.
The changes in corporate law and in the technology of financing acquisitions that operate to give
the target an effective put option are real, so it is striking not to observe their impact on the element of
the transaction structure – the MAC term – that apparently could most directly respond to this problem,
by creating an offsetting call. The phenomena that underlie the investment theory, however, also are
real. Thus, a workable transaction fix must respond effectively to both concerns. Our explanation is
that the MAC responds to the investment concern alone because other contractual techniques, such as
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a toehold acquisition, stock options, or the payment of breakup fees if the seller accepts a higher offer,
address the symmetry concern. These techniques address the symmetry problem without unnecessarily
shifting exogenous risk to the seller, and thus do not inefficiently reduce the buyer’s incentive to invest
against this risk in the post-execution/pre-closing period.39
It is interesting to speculate briefly on the widespread diffusion of MAC exceptions and the
pattern of this spread. The New York Supreme Court’s decision, in the Jardine case40, to send to the
jury a buyer’s invocation of the traditional MAC to justify its exit following a classic exogenous event -the 1987 stock market crash -- prompted transaction lawyers to focus on the ambiguity in the
traditional MAC formulation regarding exogenous risk. As the analysis in Part 3.3 above suggested,
the transaction costs of this focus are more likely to be below the gains for technology acquisitions in
which the materialization of exogenous risk can cause the most difficulty. An innovation here might have
diffused widely through Silicon valley in consequence of repeated interactions among networks of M &
A lawyers.41

39

An experienced Silicon Valley lawyer linked the scope of the MAC clause and the seller’s
option to exit to the use of different contractual techniques for addressing the symmetry and investment
concerns. The attorney recounted that the negotiation of exceptions to a MAC (which exacerbate the
symmetry concern) typically is paired with the negotiation of a narrowly drafted “fiduciary out” (which
can mitigate the symmetry concern). The more narrow the fiduciary out, the more difficult it is for the
seller to accept a higher priced offer.
40

The Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. v. Jardine Strategic Holdings Limited, #31731/87 (N.Y.
Sup. 1988).
41

Gerald Davis has studied the spread of legal practice innovations. See Gerald F. Davis,
“Agents Without Principles? The Spread of the Poison Pill through the Intercorporate Network”, 36
Admin. Sci. Q. 583 (1991); Gerald F. Davis and Henrich R. Greve, “Corporate Elite Networks and
Governance Changes in the 1980s”, 103 Am. J. Soc. 1 (1997).
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As is apparent from our 2000 sample, the next step was the spread of the new MAC and
MAE practice across industries. A number of factors may have influenced this diffusion. Perhaps most
interesting, the spread may have been due to the nature of judicial interpretation. Lawyers would
expect that judicial construction of a traditional MAC term in a particular transaction would be
influenced by changes in MAC terms in other transactions. In particular, how a court resolves the
ambiguity in the traditional MAC formulation may be influenced by the practice of parties in other
transactions to resolve the ambiguity explicitly. The nature of high tech innovations thus could have
affected the construction of traditional MACs in non-high tech deals. Transaction lawyers could come
to believe that this increase in juridical risk -- the reading in of specific inappropriate inclusions or
exclusions -- would justify creating explicit modifications to the traditional MAC that fit the deal at
issue. We note, however, that the diffusion is more than mere mimicry. In 2000, the exclusions most
central to the risk of a decline in stand alone value if the acquirer did not close in reliance on the MAC
– the loss of customer’s suppliers or employees, and a drop in target stock price – were still more than
seven times more likely to appear in agreements involving technology transactions than in agreements
involving non-technology transactions. Conversely, MAC exclusions for changes in law or regulations,
likely of greater significance in older, more heavily regulated industries, were in 2000 approximately 5
times as likely to appear in a non-technology agreement than in a technology agreement.
5. Legal and drafting implications.
It is beyond the scope of this article to analyze the extensive case law regarding MACs.42

42

We supply an analysis of the cases in a non-technical treatment of MACs. See Ronald J.
Gilson and Alan Schwartz, The Evolution of MACS (in progress).
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However, it is useful to comment briefly here on what is widely thought to be the most important case,
the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision, In re IBP, Inc. Shareholders’ Litigation43, and we
suggest an interpretive criterion for MAC adjudication that follows from our analysis here. The court
faced in IBP a traditional, and thus ambiguous, MAC and it attempted to make the term more concrete:
A MAC event, the court held, was “a significant diminution of the value of the business entity as a
whole”. This well meaning effort to deal with ambiguity in the traditional MAC formulation was
unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, parties to acquisition agreements, we have seen, have begun to
negotiate detailed MAC exceptions, thereby lessening the need for a legal default rule. The issue courts
now face is how to interpret the contract, not how to fill in the blanks.44 Second, the court’s proposed
default itself is off the mark because it focuses on clarifying the adjective “material” rather than on
distinguishing between endogenous and exogenous causes of a decline in the value of the combined
company. Materiality refers to the extent of a value change but, had values been verifiable, the MAC
term would have conditioned directly on them. Rather, because values are difficult to verify, parties
prefer courts to focus on causes.45

43

2001 WL 675330 (Del. Ch. 2001).

44

The acquisition agreement in IBP was, coincidently, a part of our 2000 sample. It was
unusual in that it was part of the 17% of the sample that had no MAC exclusions. The court did not
consider whether the general change in transactional patterns – in our sample 83% of the entire sample
and 80.3% of the non-technology sample addressed at least one element of endogenous risk – should
bear on the construction of a provision that retained the traditional ambiguous formulation.
45

A commercial law analogy may be clarifying. The Uniform Commercial Code excuses a
seller from performance when subsequent events make performance “impracticable”. This phrase
directs courts to focus on the loss the seller would have suffered from performance. Profits and losses
are difficult to verify, however. Parties thus routinely replace the UCC with force majure clauses that
list verifiable excusing events – fire, war, legal regulation – whose materialization would ordinarily cause

45
The investment theory supplies an interpretive criterion for a judicial inquiry into causation.
When a buyer attempts to exit by invoking a MAC clause, the court should ask whether the event was
within the seller’s ability to affect. As an example of this distinction, assume a MAC contains an
exception regarding economic conditions in the target’s industry. The exception should keep the buyer
in the deal if a material decrease in the seller’s profitability was caused by a sudden, but apparently
permanent, increase in imports in the industry. On the other hand, the presumption should be that the
buyer would be permitted to exit if the decline was caused by an increase in input costs against which
the seller could have, but did not, hedge. Here, however, the analysis is completed by shifting attention
to the concept of “change” in the MAC formulation. If it had not been the practice of firms such as the
seller to hedge the particular risk, then, we suggest, the relevant change should be held to be exogenous
– the realization of an external risk – rather than endogenous – that is, caused by actions the seller took
or failed to take.
Interpretive criteria for MACs are an important subject because the current inventory of MAC
exclusions retain what may be an inherent, standard-like ambiguity. For example, consider the
qualification to the exception that permits a buyer to exit when exogenous events that otherwise would
have been covered by an exception to the MAC clause have a disproportionate impact on the seller46
in light of the interpretation of the “change” requirement we just suggested. Such a disproportionate
impact could be relevant to interpretation in two opposing ways. First, it may suggest that the target

the seller to incur large losses.
46

See text at note 39 above and note 39. These exceptions appeared in none of our 1993
contracts but in 17% of the 2000 contracts.
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had actions available to it that would have prevented or lessened the impact of the apparently
exogenous event. If so, the exception to the exception should apply, so that the buyer could exit if it
wished. Second, the impact may be a consequence of the seller following a high beta strategy that was
efficient for it; the seller, that is, may have been investing less in risk cushioning activities and more in
production activities than some of its competitors. If so, the exception to the exception probably should
not apply because it is uncommon for parties to intend a seller to take actions that would differ
materially from its pre-transaction practice without saying so; costly, deviant actions would usually be
an expressed part of the agreement’s operating covenants were they meant to be taken. 47 Thus, the
exclusion’s proportionality measure would require a change in the company’s pre-event sensitivity to
industry changes.
More detailed analysis of interpretive criteria for MACs awaits further research but we offer
two concluding remarks. Initially, courts sometimes appear to suspect that a buyer who invokes a
MAC is merely reneging on a deal that turned sour. Such courts attempt to resolve ambiguities in the
MAC against the buyer. This attitude is in considerable part mistaken because it is the threat of buyer
exit that efficiently increases the seller’s incentive to take actions that reduce the probability of bad
realizations. Second, parties could aid courts by prefacing the MAC term with a discursive statement
of what they intended the term to promote and to avoid. As an example, the parties could ask courts to
use the interpretive criterion suggested here. Such a drafting approach would leave courts with much
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It is commonplace among the covenants governing the target’s conduct of its business during
the period between execution and closing that it not change its business practices without the consent of
the acquirer. From this perspective, business practices whose change would require the acquiring
company’s consent would be taken as given in interpreting the MAC clause.
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less discretion than the IBP court actually had or wanted to have; rather, a court’s residual discretion
would be channeled in a fashion that would reflect the parties’ now explicit goals.
6. Conclusion.
Hundreds of billions of dollars of assets transfer each year under what is essentially the same
acquisition agreement. This agreement has received little academic analysis despite its commercial
significance. Our paper begins such an analysis by examining an important set of acquisition terms, the
material adverse change clause and the material adverse event clause. We ask why these terms are in
the agreement and why their formulation has changed substantially over the years.
We conclude that the clauses’ presence results from two problems that parties to acquisitions
face, both of which are a consequence of the sometimes lengthy interim between the signing of an
acquisition agreement and its closing. The first problem is to induce the seller to make efficient value
preserving and value enhancing investments in the transaction; the second problem is to induce the
buyer to take precautions against or to insure against exogenous events that could reduce the value of
the new combination. These problems require creative contractual solutions because, we assume,
courts cannot observe the value of the post-transaction combination or the value affecting actions that a
seller and buyer could take; and it would be too costly for parties to create behavorial codes that courts
could merely enforce.
The MAC solves these problems in a simple but nice way. The traditional MAC permits a
buyer to exit when a material adverse change or effect would make the deal unprofitable for it. The
buyer’s exit right encourages the seller to take actions that would protect and possibly enhance the
value that the new company is expected to have. The set of MAC exceptions, in contrast, encourages
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the buyer to take actions that would protect the new company against the materialization of risks that
neither party could prevent but that the buyer could best affect. The MAC term thus allocates
transaction risks to the party that can most efficiently bear them.
We also report the results of our empirical analysis of actual MAC terms. This analysis is
preliminary, but its results are consistent with the explanations we advance here. In particular, our
theory predicts that MACs will have been in use for a long time; that ambiguities in MACs will be
resolved by allocating endogenous risk to sellers and exogenous risk to buyers; and that MAC
exceptions are more likely to appear in cases when a failed deal would reduce the seller’s stand alone
value. The data we present support these predictions. And finally our analysis supplies interpretive
criteria that could aid courts when interpreting MACs. We uncover the parties objectives in writing this
term – to create incentives for the party that can best preserve or increase value to do so. The
interpretive task should be eased for courts when they understand what the parties are attempting to
achieve.
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